Position of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom dealing with the Iranian nuclear program
by Barbara Woodward, Jérôme Bonnafont, Peter Zahneisen
France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the “E3”) wish to bring to the attention of the Security Council the status of Council resolution 2231 (2015) implementation prior to the final meeting of the Security Council before Termination Day.
The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published two reports on 31 May which clearly show the dire status of the Iran nuclear issue. The report on Iran’s implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) lays out Iran’s extensive violations of its JCPOA commitments. IAEA now assesses that Iran’s uranium stockpiles have reached more than 8,600 kg of uranium and include 408.6 kg of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent. That is more than nine significant quantities – defined by IAEA as the approximate amount from which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. As stated by the Director General in the report, Iran is the only State without nuclear weapons enriching to this level. This alone breaches four of Iran’s key JCPOA commitments: the enriched uranium stockpile limit (300 kg); the enrichment limit (3.67 per cent); use of the deep underground Fordow facility; and the development, manufacture and use of advanced centrifuges (which are also in use at Fordow). This is just one example of Iran’s failure to abide by its JCPOA commitments which extend much further: Iran has also installed new advanced centrifuge cascades during this period of reporting.
Iran’s obfuscation and lack of cooperation with IAEA on its verification and monitoring activities is highly concerning: for months now, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge on several parts of Iran’s programme, including on the production and inventory of centrifuges. Today, the Agency is not able to provide assurance of the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. This is all the more worrying in light of the Director General’s comprehensive report (GOV/2025/25), which lays out Iran’s multiple failures to implement its safeguards obligations.
There can be no doubt that Iran’s nuclear programme, far in excess of the limits imposed by the JCPOA, is a clear threat to international peace and security. The backdrop of Iranian officials making statements on Iran’s capability to produce nuclear weapons and advocating changes to Iran’s nuclear doctrine increases our concern. Any threats relating to developing nuclear weapons would run counter to Iran’s obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as to its JCPOA commitment that “under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons”.
The hollowing out of the JCPOA should be a source of profound concern for the Council.
For more than 20 years, the E3 have tirelessly pursued a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. We have driven talks forward since the revelations of an undeclared nuclear programme in Iran in the 2000s. We participated in Joint Plan of Action negotiations and negotiated the JCPOA with its participants in 2015. We participated in the negotiations to preserve JCPOA compliance and return the United States to that deal. Following Iran’s decision to cease complying with the JCPOA, and as recognized by the JCPOA Coordinator, the E3 subsequently triggered the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism in 2020 with a view to resolving Iran’s non compliance. The E3 followed that process as far as possible and regret that other participants did not engage with that process.
The E3 then committed to many further months of negotiations alongside the other JCPOA participants to return Iran to compliance, and the United States to the deal. The viable text tabled by the JCPOA Coordinator on two occasions in 2022 represented the last opportunity to return the United States to the deal and bring Iran back into compliance. Iran rejected that critical opportunity, in spite of its significant benefits to Iran, seeking to reopen negotiations with demands beyond the scope of the JCPOA. Instead, Iran chose to continue its nuclear escalation, greatly expanding its enrichment programme without any credible civilian justification.
Today, the E3 welcome negotiations between Iran and the United States. The E3 have never ceased to engage with the United States and with Iran and have offered our support towards a strong and verifiable deal that addresses sustainably the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme and ensures Iran cannot develop or acquire a nuclear weapon.
As we approach Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and JCPOA Termination Day, and as Iran continues to escalate its nuclear programme to unprecedented levels, the need for a strong new deal has never been more urgent.
We will pursue all diplomatic options to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Absent a satisfying deal, the E3 will consider triggering the snapback mechanism to address threats to international peace and security arising from Iran’s nuclear programme.
We would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.